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Abstract 
The AOC program is an internationally managed hazardous waste remediation program focusing on 
the Great Lakes Basin, yet since its inception in 1987 little concrete evidence of its effects have been 
documented. Using tract level data from the 1970, 1980 and 1990 decennial censuses, this study 
employs a fixed effects panel data model and difference in differences analysis in order to recover 
the effect of AOC Listing on local property values. The results show large and significant negative 
effects to a change in hazardous waste status, all while the hazardous waste condition itself remains 
constant. This effect extends beyond the AOC and suggests heterogeneous impacts at different 
distances. These findings are useful in policy implementation and analysis, as they demonstrate both 
a scope of influence and potential cost considerations, and information on such informational effects 
will aide attempts to recover net benefits of longstanding, mostly unfinished remediation efforts. 
 
 
I. Introduction 
The Great Lakes Areas of Concern program (AOC) officially began in 1987 with the listing of 43 
sites that are “watersheds, or portions of watersheds, along the Great Lakes suffering from degraded 
environmental conditions stemming from historic and ongoing pollution.”1  Of these, 31 are either 
wholly within the United States or jointly managed between the US and Canada, and 4 of those have 
met their restoration goals and achieved “delisted” status-that is the completion of the AOC program 
and formal removal from AOC status. This program has provided the renewal of ecosystem services to 
the surrounding communities and the Great Lakes system as a whole, yet this has been at a cost of 
several million dollars across the sites and over the past 29 years. In continuing funding for this and 
other hazardous waste cleanup programs, a difficulty presents itself in comparing the cost inputs with 
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the non-market benefits of a restored environment. Within this realm there is also an issue in the fact 
that these valuations may reflect perceptions as much as services rendered, where the labeling effect of 
AOC status may obscure the benefits added through restoration. As only 4 sites have been delisted, the 
majority of AOC’s are providing restored services that may be masked by the ongoing nature of the 
cleanups-that is the labelling effect of being listed as an AOC.    
Attempts to estimate the value that individuals place on environmental goods and services have 
been myriad and methodologically diverse in the field of environmental economics. In order to value the 
provisioning of a good such as environmental quality (the expected output of remediation) no explicit 
market exists and thus techniques to recover individual willingness to pay (WTP) have focused on two 
chief methodologies: revealed preferences and stated preferences. The latter has its benefits yet 
requires heavy cost and time intensive generation of survey preference data that still has some 
limitations in using hypothetical rather than actual choices. Revealed preferences have become a 
preferred methodology for both cost and causal reasons, and these take advantage of other goods and 
services that have well defined markets in order to examine an environmental service as a price 
determining component of these marketed goods. The hedonic pricing methodology has been used 
often2 in the literature analyzing hazardous waste as well as several other environmental disamenities, 
yet does not come without its own criticism. Misspecification is often cited by detractors, yet 
methodologies have improved and risen in application over the past 15 years3 to correctly isolate and 
identify causally the desired effects.  
Hazardous waste surrounding the Great Lakes has been a topic of great interest in the region. 
The 43 total AOC’s are the most heavily contaminated hazardous waste sites that affect Great Lakes 
watersheds. AOC’s were determined through a collaborative effort between local stakeholders, 
                                                          
2 See Gamper-Rabindran and Timmins (2013), Greenstone and Gallgher (2008), Muehlenbachs et al (2015) 
3 Kuminoff and Pope (2014) 
scientific experts, state and national environmental groups and the International Joint Commission4. 
They were defined as "geographic areas designated by the Parties where significant impairment of 
beneficial uses has occurred as a result of human activities at the local level5," and were officially listed 
as actionable parcels under the 1987 amendments to the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement 
between Canada and the United States.  
This paper will implement a quasi-experimental approach based on difference-in-differences 
(DD) regression analysis exploiting the fact that an environmental disamenity has localized effects that 
should, at a certain distance from the site, go to zero. In a similar methodology to those such as Linden 
and Rockhoff (2008) and Muehlenbachs, Spiller and Timmins (2016), this paper will compare housing 
prices and neighborhood demographic characteristics at the 31 US AOC’s at the local and distance 
adjusted non-local (control) level, and then evaluate their respective changes pre- and post-listing 
decision (1987) in order to recover this difference-in-differences.  Utilizing this fixed effects model and 
distance-as-control, this methodology will correct for unobservables that may be correlated with listing 
status and with property determinants in order to identify the causal effects of AOC listing on property 
values.  
 It is posited that a stigma associated with clean up status may “turn on” at listing and off at 
delisting and that this titular disamenity may affect perceptions that are capitalized in the housing 
market. Delisting has not happened for the majority of both Superfund and AOC sites, but Gamper-
Rabindrin and Timmins (2012) find evidence for a positive effect on those Superfund sites that were 
delisted.  It is also possible that there is some forward-looking positive expectation of reestablished 
                                                          
4 The International Joint Commission is an independent binational organization established by the United States and Canada 
under the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, and oversees the implementation of the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 
1978, as amended in 2012.   
5 EPA. Great Lakes Areas of Concern. United States Environmental Protection Agency. 13 January 2016. 
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environmental services associated with listing, and thus the determination of the direction of the total 
listing effect should have significant impact on attempts to value cleanup programs that are more often 
than not ongoing.    
This paper matches census tract level data, normalized from 1970-1990 via the Geolytics 
database, with individual AOC and state level fixed effects and time trends to evaluate changes in 
property value associated with the listing decision at certain buffer distances from the site. Exploiting 
the fact that houses can be viewed as goods composed of several characteristics, each with its own 
marginal WTP, Rosen (1974) found that through repeated interactions through buyers and sellers, a 
Hedonic Price Schedule (HPS) emerges at the tangencies between individual indifference curves and 
offer curves that can isolate the MWTP for any of these characteristics. This paper utilizes such intuition 
to investigate the characteristic trait (disamenity) of hazardous waste presence (and the sub-level 
environmental service detriments associated) and isolated its effect from other determinants of housing 
prices in order to recover the WTP at the margin related to new public information associated with AOC 
listing. 
 The findings of this paper suggest a strong and negative relationship between the AOC listing 
decision and tract average property value changes. This effect is heterogeneous, but negative, at 
different buffer distances away from an AOC, suggesting a differential impact of the information effect 
at different distances, or levels of local. The results also demonstrate some interplay between forward 
looking positive effects and negative perception effects. Given that hazardous waste remediation efforts 
take decades to reach completion, it is vital to the policy context that evaluators and decision makers 
understand the overall negative impact that certain aspects of ongoing remediation have in order to 
make optimum listing and funding decisions.    
This paper proceeds as follows: section II covers relevant background information on the AOC 
program; section III provides an overview of previous literature investigating the economic benefits of 
hazardous waste cleanup sites and AOC’s, and other related studies; section IV overviews the data 
sources; section V reviews the adjacency buffer; section VI covers the econometric methodology and 
model; section VII analyzes results; and section VIII concludes.  
 
 
II. Background on the Areas of Concern Program 
The remediation of the 31 Great Lakes Areas of Concern (AOC) under USEPA jurisdiction has 
been projected to cost upwards of $4.5 billion (2005 USD) (ref), and the program has seen increased 
attention and funding since that estimate leading to significant interest in finding a causal estimate of 
benefits. Within this broader question, and given the ongoing nature of the majority of the AOC sites, 
the issue of a labeling effect becomes prominent. This is the question of the stigma that may be 
associated with a site formally entering a hazardous waste remediation program, the positive forward 
looking effects combat that stigma, and the overall direction of said effect.  
In a 2016 consideration of applying for Superfund remediation funding to deal with historical 
hazardous waste in Ann Arbor, MI, Mayor Christopher Taylor “said in an interview with the Daily that 
while the EPA would likely lead to a more comprehensive cleanup of the contaminated water, the 
stigma of Superfund status could damage property values in the city.”6 It is intuitive that labelling comes 
with a price, and this price may impact the economic viability of remediation.  
                                                          
6 Kuang, Brian. “Ann Arbor Township Considers Federal Intervention Groundwater Contamination.” Michigan Daily. 23 March 
2016.  
 
The AOC program was first suggested in the 1972 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement 
between the United States and Canada, where both nations had seen significant environmental 
degradation of the shared Great Lakes resource and proposed a series of studies to motivate the listing 
of sites in most dire need of remediation. From 1972 to 1987, 111 sites were considered that had had 
former or ongoing industrial or municipal waste issues that contributed directly to one of the five Great 
Lakes watersheds. Forty-two made the final list in 1987, and a 43rd was added in 1992.7  
As this program came about in similar timing with the national and more publicized Superfund 
program, it is important to note a few distinctions. First, unlike Superfund sites, AOC’s are non-binding 
designations that open up channels of public funding that are managed hierarchically from state 
environmental quality agencies down to the local sites themselves. This is as opposed to the mandatory 
responsible party system of Superfund which enforces private payment for restoration. Second, 
Superfund sites utilize a fairly well defined hazardous waste ranking score system to identify any site 
that meets a certain numerical threshold, whereas AOC’s have more individualized site analyses and, 
again, only focus on the Great Lakes basin. That being said, it is the case that Superfund sites have 
overlapped with or abutted AOC sites, and thus this is an important variable that will be controlled for in 
the analysis to follow.  
Following from this discussion, there are many entangled effects surrounding hazardous waste 
cleanup sites that make proper specification and analysis challenging. Beyond the existence of 
Superfund sites, there are community based efforts and other funding sources that can overlap with 
AOC and Superfund programs alike, and there is a certain caveat to the idea that remediation begins in 
absolute upon listing. During the period 1972-1987 while potential AOC sites were considered, it was 
                                                          
7 International Joint Commission Data Portal. “Great Lakes Water Quality Reports, 1972-1987.” 
www.ijc.org/en_/reports_and_publications 
not the case that sites were simply analyzed and left alone, but efforts both through the GLWQA and 
other local and federal programs existed in hard to quantify fashions. There were sites that improved 
enough over this period to be omitted from the final list, and there were sites on the final list that had 
been invested in over this period before the 1987 listing, thus the consideration of not “on the list” sites 
as untreated is dubious, and the consideration of sites as treated after listing is likely equally so.   
This is also true of the Superfund program and yet has not been discussed in the literature, 
where not only do existing National Priorities List (NPL) sites overlap with other programs and monies, 
but the sites that did not make that list and often serve as control groups are rarely left untreated by 
those other programs and their local communities. While this presents problems for isolating when 
exactly one can say a site begins remediation and can be labeled as treated, it does not do the same for 
the listing decision. The official listing of AOC’s is unfettered by the activities before and after, and 
simply reflects a titular change that may have affected the perception of individuals in regards to those 
activities. Thus, while this issue is potentially confounding (and unconsidered) in the previous literature, 
it is a point of motivation for this paper as the listing effect did “turn on” at a single point.   
As of the present, only 4 AOC’s have been delisted in the United States, and these delistings are 
also too recent to yield the amount of data needed for proper analysis. Thus an examination of the 
listing decision is warranted in order to capture effects that delisting could reverse, and add preciseness 
to the discussion of the benefits of remediation programs that are often calculated before that delisting 
happens.  
Through focusing on the effects of listing decisions as treatment, this paper seeks to uncover the 
potential biasing effects of remediation as it is occurring, disentangling the effects of improved 
environmental services from the effects of the improvement process itself. In the context of justifying 
expenses and correctly allocating funding towards improving environmental services, the validity of 
these techniques and their findings will be paramount.  
 
III. Literature Review 
 
Despite its long history, only a few studies, and all in the past decade, have rigorously attempted 
to evaluate the benefits of the AOC program. However, the few studies which exist and determine WTP 
for AOC remediation have focused at the individual AOC level and have fallen short of the statistical and 
quasi-experimental rigor necessary for causal inference and suffer from the same misspecification issues 
typically cited8. A holistic evaluation of the benefits of the AOC program has yet to be endeavored. 
However, the findings of these reports all suggest higher benefits than costs and motivate further, more 
extensive analysis.   
Recent literature at the forefront of hedonic pricing analysis has examined other hazardous 
waste cleanup programs, and most often the USEPA Superfund program. Despite the usage of similar 
and currently favored methodologies, the results have pointed in multiple directions. Greenstone and 
Gallagher (2008) found little to no positive effects on housing prices due to Superfund cleanup. However 
they analyze sites as treated upon listing which could potentially be missing the actual benefits of the 
program and also may not be able to reconcile the labeling effects that this paper seeks to analyze. 
Greenstone and Gallagher also do not employ detailed spatial analysis, which may have led to a muting 
of the observed effect. Finally, this study also utilizes a regression discontinuity strategy that may not 
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create a completely valid counterfactual, as unlisted sites may need to be more rigorously proved as 
untreated due to the existence of other cleanup efforts, as explained in section II. 
Gamper-Rabindran and Timmins (2012) cite some of these factors, and reinvestigate the same 
question utilizing delisting and finer spatial and distance based analysis in order to recover findings of 
significant gains in property value associated with Superfund cleanup. While they utilize the same 
sample and a similar RDD strategy as Greenstone and Gallagher, the spatial component is a key 
difference. By examining within tract variation, they investigate the distribution of housing value 
changes in order to recover spatially localized benefits to cleanup efforts. This paper adds to the 
dialogue surrounding contradictory findings regarding hazardous waste cleanup and suggests that via 
proper spatial analysis a better estimate can be recovered. This paper also does some preliminary 
analysis of the listing decision, as it breaks treatment down into a composite variable including 
proposition, listing, constructing, completion and delisting. While they recover small but positive listing 
effects, the negative proposition effect may explain some of this. Furthermore, the spatial boundary 
used as the “end of the local effect” is taken from an external study, which precludes a robust or 
program specific evaluation of that boundary, something that this paper focuses on.    
The analysis of the AOC program will employ similar hedonic methodologies to the above 
mentioned papers, but will exploit spatial variation in order to establish a control, and will focus on 
hazardous waste listing status as a price determinant that mediates the relationship between 
improvements in environmental quality and marginal WTP (i.e. housing value). This distance-as-control 
method is supported by Muehlenbachs et al (2015) and Linden and Rockoff (2008). Muehlenbachs et al, 
in examining shale gas development, find that the effects of a localized amenity go to zero at a certain 
buffer distance, and exploit that distance to isolate the effect of well installation on treated vs. 
untreated properties. The key elements of this paper, which motivate the control strategy for the 
oncoming analysis, is that an environmental (dis)amenity has localized effects that stop at a certain 
buffer distance away from the source, and that those properties outside of that buffer can serve as a 
control group.   
 
IV. Data 
A large dataset was compiled from several sources for the analysis. The data on the AOC sites 
came from the International Joint Commission’s library and the EPA-managed individual AOC websites. 
AOC specific information on site location, size and history was found through these two resources. This 
included 31 individual site shapefiles that were necessary for spatial analysis. Additionally, as noted 
above, original consideration dates under the GLWQA were found for each site that predated the 1987 
official listing decision. It is possible that these activities may have led to stigmatization or restored 
services that happened prior to the official listing, and thus allows for a control of that potential effect. 
 USEPA Superfund data was obtained from the NPL and EPA data stores, including shape files 
and historical information pertinent to the analysis. This was done to address overlaps between AOC’s 
and Superfund sites and to control for potentially biased results. Only those Superfund sites that were 
within the utilized buffer distances and had been listed before 1987 were considered for each AOC. The 
timing of this listing was included to better measure the preciseness of this effect.  
Demographic information as well as housing price and characteristics information was collected 
from the Geolytics Neighborhood Change Database. This data came from the 1970, 1980 and 1990 
Decennial Censuses. These data have been normalized to the 2010 census tract boundaries which 
represent 4,000 person density centroids, and was taken within varying buffer distances of each AOC, 
the full extent of the data set is the seven-state Great Lakes region. Distance was measured, using 
ArcGIS, from AOC feature border to census tract centroid. Only those tracts with complete data from 
1970-1990 were considered for the main analysis, though separate regression of just 1980-1990 data is 
also included.  Through this, the proper explanatory variables were identified that contribute to the 
model’s understanding of shifting house prices as measured in the decennial census.  
This demographic data started with 21,261 tracts, which is all of the seven states of IL, IN, MI, MN, 
NY, OH, WI, as they were fully tracted by 1990. Removing “absent tracts” from each decade, 1970 
yielded 4907, the 1980 census 7 and the 1990 census 1 additional, leaving 16,346 tracts that had data 
during each census. Then, 980, 28, and 19 tracts from the 1970, 1980, 1990 censuses, respectively, were 
removed where aggregate housing value data was missing, leaving 15,319 tracts. Finally, 1,538, 425 and 
3 tracts from the 1970, 1980 and 1990 censuses, respectively, were removed where the number of 
housing units was missing (meaning there was no way to calculate average value), leaving 13,353 tracts. 
Each tract was decomposed into three long form data observations, one for each census, yielding 40,056 
observations for the analysis. 
Due to the heterogeneous nature of census collection, especially in more rural areas, and also 
the reporting nature of the key statistic (aggregate housing value) during the 1970’s and 1980’s, certain 
tracts are missing from the data set (in fact the majority). See Figure 1 for a mapping of included tracts. 
There is no reason to suspect endogenous tract placement that coincides with AOC listing and distance, 
as the sites are varyingly affected by the amount of missing tracts, but this is discussed further in section 
VII. Additionally, the dependent variable of interest is housing value, yet given the nature of census data 
the best representation of this was “owner occupied non condo housing units”. While a good proxy, this 
obviously restricts the dataset to only those properties, and was an often omitted question that reduced 
the sample size. A final note is on the coarseness of the data. While the previous literature mentioned 
uses individual house transaction data and block level census data, this analysis uses tract level data and 
average tract housing value. 
Figure 1, Repeat Sample Tracts 1970-1990
 
Map of Tracts (red) overlaid with 10km buffer AOC suites (green).  
Data Source: USEPA 
 
 
 
V. Distance Strategy 
This section investigates the relationship between distance and the effect of an environmental 
disamenity. In this case, the identification strategy seeks to find localized informational effects that 
correlate with the AOC listing decision. The effects can be either positive of negative, as there could be 
some forward looking expectation of improved conditions or there could be an increased awareness of 
the environmental disamenity and forecasting of the negative aspects of restoration activities (noise, 
obscured views, increased traffic).   The key assumption tested here is that this informational effect 
should vary with distance in two important ways: that different distance bins can proxy for different sets 
of localized effects and that the effect goes to zero at a certain distance. This section will provide 
evidence for a buffer distance from an AOC that signifies the distance at which localized effects go to 
zero, which is a foundational element of the control strategy employed via the difference in differences 
estimation in section VII.  
This test is conducted via the utilization of repeat observation census tracts, creating a fully 
balanced panel data set with each observation being decomposed into long form data including the 
1970, 1980 and 1990 years. This strategy is consistent with Linden and Rockoff (2008) and 
Muehlenbachs, et al (2015) in determining where a localized (dis)amenity no longer has localized 
effects.  
First, a linear regression of the log of price controls for various time variant and invariant effects 
including property, AOC, lake, and county by year effects. Leaving “distance to nearest AOC” out of the 
initial regression, the resulting residuals are stored and a second, polynomial, regression of the residuals 
on distance from the nearest AOC examines the extent to which the heterogeneity in property values 
surrounding AOC’s can be explained by distance to the nearest AOC. This second regression is in fact a 
composite of several regressions taken at different bandwidths along the independent variable. Figure 2 
depicts this relationship, using both an algorithmically generated bandwidth of around 3KM and also 
1KM, similarly to that of Muehlenbachs et al (2015), the results below demonstrate a positive effect to 
proximity prior to listing (1970 and 1980) which becomes much closer to zero post-listing (1990), 
signifying a negative effect on housing values post-listing for within-boundary properties.  
The observed temporal relationship is weaker closest to the AOC sites and becomes increasingly 
stronger until it disappears at around 30-35 KM. Gamper-Rabindran and Timmins (2015) utilize a figure 
of 3 miles (approximately 5KM) as an upper bound of their effect, taken from a panel data study of the 
relationship between housing prices and hazardous waste site placement (Jenkins et al. 2006). 
Muehlenbachs et al use two different localized effects for their model, where an adjacency effect is 
found to be bounded at 2KM and a further vicinity effect at 20KM. The AOC listing effect is shown here 
to extend past 30KM, which is an order of magnitude larger Jenkins’ figure and Muehlenbachs’ 
adjacency figure, but is not much further than their vicinity figure. Although those studies were 
investigating the full effect and not the listing effect per se, robustness checks will utilize a series of 
different buffer distances, including the aforementioned 2 and 5 KM, as the effect of listing a hazardous 
waste site should, intuitively, go no further than the full effect of said site.  
The aforementioned distance strategy employed by Muehlenbachs et al (2015) and Linden and 
Rockoff (2008) utilizes a two tiered distance buffer strategy that decomposes their effects into 
adjacency and vicinity effects. There is no similar intuition, and little additional information to be 
gleaned, from such a distinction for this paper, however. The effect of listing is not assumed to be 
heterogeneous within 32KM (the figure to be used subsequently), but the motivation and intuition 
behind where effects could be direct and indirect is lacking in this instance. The previous literature also 
does not employ nearly as rigorous of a strategy on the extent of the vicinity buffer (which essentially is 
the extent of the effect being studied) as they do on the end of the adjacency buffer, and this lax 
approach fails to convincingly identify extent of the effect and its full impact. That being said, the 
findings in this section suggest a further scope of influence for the AOC program, but this will be tested 
later on. Section VII will include a secondary investigation of the possibility of a decomposed vicinity and 
adjacency effect, yet it is the total effect and its distance-extent that are of key interest.   
In identifying the distance beyond which localized effects of AOC listing go to zero, this strategy 
allows those tracts outside the effect-buffer to serve as controls in the following regressions in section 6. 
The summary statistics under the ideal buffer specification are included in the appendix.   
 
Figure 2: Price Gradient of Distance from AOC 
 
 
 
VI. Econometric Strategy and Model 
1. Fixed Effect Model 
The section describes the strategy employed to explain the changes in a tract’s average property 
value over time. Utilizing the distance control strategy described in the previous section, a fixed effects 
model and difference-in-differences analysis, a single regression controls for time variant and invariant 
effects, tract effects, AOC effects and other probed variables in order to reach an estimate of the effect 
of AOC listing on individual tract level property value changes. The model is follows as below.  
                         ln⁡(𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒)=𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝛾𝑖
<𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑝𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖                                              (1) 
In equation (1) 𝛼0 is a constant term, 𝜇𝑖  is a vector of time invariant fixed effects including tract effects 
(summary statistics in appendix 1), 𝑣𝑖𝑡 is a vector of time variant and interactional effects including 
county x year effects, and 𝜀𝑖  is a residual term. 𝑝𝑖  is the effect of the presence of an AOC on housing 
value, interacted with, and mediated by, a distance buffer.  
 
-.
0
5
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
L
o
c
a
l 
P
o
ly
n
o
m
ia
l 
R
e
s
id
u
a
ls
0 10 20 30 40 50
Distance (KM)
Before After
Residuals vs Distance
-.
1
0
.1
.2
.3
L
o
c
a
l 
P
o
ly
n
o
m
ia
l 
R
e
s
id
u
a
ls
0 10 20 30 40 50
Distance KM
Before After
Residuals vs. Distance, 1 KM Bandwidth
  ln⁡(𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒)=𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝛾𝑖
<𝐴𝐷𝐽 + 𝛼2𝛾𝑖
<𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑋 + 𝛼3𝛾𝑖
<𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑅𝑂 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖                                  (2) 
 
In equation (2) effect 𝑝𝑖  has been decomposed into three effects, and thus three dummy 𝛾′𝑠 for 
adjacency, proximity and a macro effect that represents larger, regional trends. This third effect, 𝛼3 ,is 
absent in the regression, as county level effects are collinear with state level effects, and larger Great 
Lakes Basin effects are not observed as the sample is fully contained within the GLB. The model will be 
tested with and without the proximity effect, as explained in section 6. 
 
2. Difference in Differences Strategy 
Here the differencing strategy is outlined, where treatment, as a temporal marker, allows an isolation of 
the listing effect via the assumption of similar pre-treatment. 
 ∆𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸=⁡𝛼1 + 𝛼3 
  ∆𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑅𝑂= 𝛼3 
 𝛼1 = ∆𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇 − ∆𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑅𝑂= (𝛼1 + 𝛼3) − (𝛼3) 
This is the strategy employed with equation (1), 𝛼1 represents the informational effect on housing price 
change pre and post listing for all tracts within the treatment buffer. 
 
   2.1 Proximity Effects Difference in Differences:  
 ∆𝐴𝐷𝐽=⁡𝛼1 + 𝛼2 + 𝛼3 
 ∆𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑋= 𝛼2 + 𝛼3 
 ∆𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑅𝑂= 𝛼3 
For the strategy in line with equation (2), the effect of being within an adjacent tract is the sum of 
adjacency, proximity and macro effects. The effect of being in the proximal tracts is decomposed into 
two effects, proximity and macro effects. Broader regional trends for the 7 Great Lakes Basin States 
correspond to the macro effect. 
 𝛼1 = ∆𝐴𝐷𝐽 − ∆𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑋= (𝛼1 + 𝛼2 + 𝛼3) − (𝛼2 + 𝛼3) 
In this differencing strategy 𝛼1 represents the effect of adjacency, 𝛼2 represents the effect of adjacency 
and (𝛼1 + 𝛼2) represent the total effect for tracts within the localized buffer. As stated previously, there 
is little motivation for focusing on the difference between the proximity and adjacency effects in the 
AOC context as their combination should be the full listing effect, but such an analysis could prove 
informational through the decomposition of the effect.   
2.2 Final Equation 
The final equations used in the results section are presented below, as taken from a combination of 
equations (1) and (2) and their respective DD strategies.  
                                 ln⁡(𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒)=𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝛾𝑖
<𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇 ∗ 𝛿1990 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖                                              (3)           
Equation (3) represents a single buffer distance regression, where 𝛿1990 is an interactional dummy for 
the treatment period (1990 observations) on the distance-based listing effect, 𝛾𝑖
<𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇.  
 
                            ln⁡(𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒)=𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝛾𝑖
<𝐴𝐷𝐽 ∗ 𝛿1990 + 𝛼2𝛾𝑖
<𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑋 ∗ 𝛿1990 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖                             (4)      
 
 Equation (4) has decomposed the buffer distance variable into adjacency and proximity effects, 
both using 𝛿1990 as an interactional dummy for the treatment period.  
VII. Results 
The first set of regressions shown in Table 1 show a probe of different buffer distances, utilizing 
numbers taken from the literature and from the polynomial regression output from section 5. This 
regression reflects equation (3) from section 6, and uses normal OLS standard errors, tract effects and 
county x year effects. The results demonstrate a negative effect of being within any of the specified 
buffer distances, compared to those outside, for the post listing period (i.e. 1990 observations). This 
effect ranges between -.0508 and -.074, translating to a -5.2% to -7.6% decrease in average housing 
price post AOC listing, within buffer census tracts. This result is significant to the 1% level for all 
distances tested.   
Table 2 represents the same regression, but employs robust standard error estimation. This 
simply relaxes the assumption that variance is equal across all observations, and uses White’s estimator 
that allows variance to be different at each observation point, creating an equally unbiased but better 
fitted estimate of standard error. This specification makes sense as there could be some unobserved 
heterogeneity within the data that is correlated with any of the control variables, distance making the 
most sense, and this simply corrects for possible heteroskedasticity. The results from Table 2 show equal 
effects to table one (as it is only the standard error calculation that has changed), but find smaller 
standard error terms. The potential for heteroskedastic error terms is certainly viable, and therefore 
robust standard errors will be the preferred calculation throughout the remaining regressions. 
The 32 KM buffer distance, as observed in section 5, is found to have the largest effect. The 
effect tails off immediately, and this lines up with the prediction from the polynomial regression, lending 
confidence to the usage of 32KM as the preferred distance specification throughout the remaining 
regressions. The observation of the effect being larger at further distances makes some intuitive sense 
when considering how the listing effect should function. As an informational effect, the change 
observed is not in hazardous waste condition, but merely in the labelling of an area as such. It seems 
that for those tracts closest to an AOC, their main method of awareness would be in direct observation 
of AOC effects and they are likely to have been more severely aware prior to listing. For those tracts 
further out, however, information (of a secondary nature) is likely the main source of AOC awareness, 
and thus the labelling effect is likely stronger at medium versus short distances within the total effect 
buffer. This observation also creates some motivation for the investigation of an adjacency (direction 
observation) and proximity (informational awareness) pair of buffer distances, as will be examined 
further on. 
Table 1 
 2 KM 5 KM 10 KM 18 KM 32 KM 
Ln(Price) -0.0508*** -0.0521*** -0.0483*** -0.0647*** -0.0740*** 
 (0.0103) (0.0100) (0.0096) (0.0091) (0.0090) 
      
Observations 40056 40056 40056 40056 40056 
Adjusted R2 0.8543 0.8543 0.8543 0.8544 0.8544 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Decennial Census 1970, 1980 and 1990 
Single distance buffer (tract centroid to AOC edge), county x year, property, AOC x year effects 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
Table 2 
 2 KM 5 KM 10 KM 18 KM 32 KM 
Ln(Price) -0.0508*** -0.0521*** -0.0483*** -0.0647*** -0.0740*** 
 (0.0094) (0.0095) (0.0100) (0.0093) (0.0098) 
Observations       40056      40056      40056      40056      40056 
Adjusted R2 0.8543 0.8543 0.8543 0.8544 0.8544 
      
Robust Standard errors in parentheses 
Decennial Census 1970, 1980 and 1990 
Single distance buffer (tract centroid to AOC edge), county x year, property, AOC x year effects 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 Table 3 represents the same regression model as table 2, but with added effects. This similarly 
utilizes equation (3), but adds “full suite” effects-a set of controls that isn’t utilized in the general 
literature but makes intuitive sense in the AOC context. Lake x year effects are used to control for Great 
Lake specific confounders and distance to nearest water feature is included to control for the package of 
effects that water proximity has on property value that may be lost in a simple distance-based 
regression. Distance to nearest Superfund site is included to control for the effects of overlapping 
programmatic efforts. Additionally, a variable for the number of beneficial use impairments (BUI) that 
ranges from 0-14 is included to investigate perception responses to the number of detrimental effects 
that are present. Finally, a running variable for the number of years an AOC had been considered before 
being added to the list is included to control for confounds such as earlier informational campaigns. The 
coefficient on the distance term is lower at each distance tested, but again the effects are all negative, 
significant to the 1% level and the 32 KM specification has the largest (in magnitude) effect. The 
breakdown of the suite effects is discussed with table 5 below.   
 
 
Table 3 
 2 KM 5 KM 10 KM 18 KM 32 KM 
Distance -0.0472*** -0.0485*** -0.0432*** -0.0597*** -0.0714*** 
 (0.0095) (0.0096) (0.0102) (0.0096) (0.0102) 
      
Years Considered 0.0288 0.0255 0.0246 0.0300 0.0371 
 (0.0672) (0.0672) (0.0671) (0.0674) (0.0676) 
      
Distance Superfund 0.000000741
*** 
0.000000745
*** 
0.000000743*** 0.000000744*** 0.000000769*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
      
Distance Water -6.90e-08 -7.40e-08* -7.67e-08* -8.79e-08** 0.000000109** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
      
BUI # 0.124*** 0.122*** 0.122*** 0.121*** 0.119*** 
 (0.0151) (0.0152) (0.0152) (0.0153) (0.0152) 
      
Observations 40056 40056 40056 40056 40056 
Adjusted R2 0.8546 0.8546 0.8546 0.8547 0.8548 
Robust Standard errors in parentheses 
Decennial Census 1970, 1980 and 1990 
Single distance buffer (tract centroid to AOC edge), county x year, property, AOC x year effects 
Full Suite Effects: Years considered, distance to nearest water feature, distance to nearest Superfund site, lake x year 
effects, BUI effects 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Table 4 
 Ln(Price) Ln(Price) Ln(Price) Ln(Price) Ln(Price) FS FS FS FS FS 
2 KM -0.0194**     -0.0176*     
 (0.0092)     (0.0093)     
5 KM  -0.0157*     -0.0140    
  (0.0092)     (0.0092)    
           
10 KM   -0.00268     0.000891   
   (0.0101)     (0.0101)   
           
18 KM    -0.0254**     -0.0207**  
    (0.0101)     (0.0101)  
32 KM -0.0671*** -0.0671*** -0.0726*** -0.0566*** -0.0104 -0.0651*** -0.0652*** -0.0719*** -0.0573*** -0.00985 
 (0.0099) (0.0099) (0.0101) (0.0110) (0.0111) (0.0103) (0.0102) (0.0104) (0.0112) (0.0111) 
           
50 KM     -0.0832***     -0.0819*** 
     (0.0123)     (0.0126) 
Observations 40056 40056 40056 40056 40056 40056 40056 40056 40056 40056 
Adjusted R2 0.8544 0.8544 0.8544 0.8544 0.8545 0.8548 0.8548 0.8548 0.8548 0.8549 
           
Robust Standard errors in parentheses 
Decennial Census 1970, 1980 and 1990 
Single distance buffer and Proximity buffer (tract centroid to AOC edge), county x year, property, AOC x year effects 
Full Suite (FS) Effects: Years considered, distance to nearest water feature, distance to nearest Superfund site, lake x year effects, BUI effects 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
Table 4 shows both a testing of buffer distances as specified in section VI equation (4), probing a 
few different sets of adjacency and proximity effects. While this binary distinction is not as strongly 
motivated as in the literature, there is some evidence for a heterogeneous listing effect based on 
distance within the treatment boundary. Table 4 tests proximity buffers of 32 and 50 KM while using 2, 
5, 10, 18 and 32 KM adjacency buffers, consistent with the previous analysis. At the same time, the 
indicators from the full suite of controls are tested across the different proximity specifications, with the 
full suite results as the final 5 columns presented. For the 32 KM specification, a proximity buffer of 50 
was set to test for further effects.  
 Looking at the proximity buffers, the setting of 32KM is significant at the 1% level, and it 
represents 5.8% to 7.5% reduction in tract average housing value across the basic and full suite 
regressions. For the basic specification, proximity is significant for the 2KM, 5KM and 18KM adjacency 
buffers. It is significant for the 2KM and 18KM adjacency buffers for the full suite specification. Under 
both, the 32KM adjacency buffer is no longer significant, and the 50KM proximity region is, with an 
impact of around -8.5% on housing price. It is interesting to note that the sum of significant adjacent and 
proximity effects is larger than the single boundary effect, but this is difficult to explain. The notion of 
direct observation effects versus informational effects can explain some of the story, but not entirely. 
While the proximity results are significant in some places, the intuition is slightly lacking and thus the 
preferred specification still remains the single distance buffer.  
Table 5 Ln(Price)  Ln(Price) 
32 KM -0.0704***   
 (0.0087)   
    
ResC 0 Eutr 0.00475 
 (.)  (0.0252) 
    
Tain -0.0303 ResW -0.0160 
 (0.1029)  (0.0617) 
    
DegF -0.294** Beac 0.175*** 
 (0.1240)  (0.0479) 
    
Fish 0.0637 DegA -0.0789* 
 (0.0423)  (0.0423) 
    
Bird 0.198** AddC -0.00603 
 (0.0777)  (0.0405) 
    
DegB 0 DegP -0.123*** 
 (.)  (0.0394) 
    
ResD -0.104* Loss 0 
 (0.0543)  (.) 
    
Observations 40056   
Adjusted R2 0.8644   
Robust Standard errors in parentheses 
Decennial Census 1970, 1980 and 1990 
Single distance buffer (tract centroid to AOC edge), county x year, property, AOC x year effects 
Full Suite (FS) Effects: Years considered, distance to nearest water feature, distance to nearest Superfund site, lake x year effects, BUI effects 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Table 5 shows a breakdown on the full suite effects, but they are slightly mixed, a discussion of 
the results of table 3 will also follow. The distance to nearest water feature is significant across most 
specifications, but is very small. Yet it is in the predicted direction (the further out from water the less 
housing price should be). A problem is likely that the USGS hydrological data used to generate this 
indicator included every body of water from small ponds to backyard creeks to Great Lakes, and thus an 
indicator that represented distance from the affected AOC water feature would likely yield stronger 
results. Distance to Superfund is significant at the 1% level for all tests, yet it is a small effect of around 
.0001%. The magnitude of this effect is possibly due to the availability of centroid point files for 
Superfund sites, whereas the AOC files utilize full area shapefiles-thus the extent of overlap was 
unobserved-and also temporal data for the Superfund sites was not readily available. However, the 
notion of a positive Superfund effect makes intuitive sense, as this results in additional funding 
available, a potentially more recognizable brand of hazardous waste cleanup, and also a likelihood of 
alternative and possibly earlier informational effects, among other possibilities. 
 The years considered indicator represents how many years (some as high as 16) before listing an 
AOC was investigated. This oftentimes correlated with earlier cleanup efforts, earlier information 
dissemination and other potential confounds. This effect is not significant across all specifications, but is 
in the direction theorized. The effect of earlier consideration on the informational effect should 
intuitively be positive, as earlier information should reduce the impact of the listing effect, and because 
those tracts that had seen restoration may have become desensitized to its presence or seen its 
benefits. Finally, the coefficient on BUI presence is equal to a -12.0% effect on tract average property 
value. This effect is much larger than expected, but it is in the expected direction and significant at the 
1% level across all specifications, but given its magnitude it should be interpreted cautiously.  
   
 
 
 Table 5 shows a regression under the preferred specification, equation (3), buffer distance of 32 
KM and full suite effects. However, it breaks down the BUI figure into a dummy for each beneficial use 
impaired. A coded list of BUI’s is in appendix 2.  Degraded fish populations, bird and animal deformities, 
restricted dredging activities, beach closures, degraded aesthetics and degradation of phytoplankton 
populations are all significant. While it is a little ambitious to attempt to understand how these effects 
are demonstrating heterogeneous informational effects, it is a worthy exercise and there are some 
intuitive results. Each BUI represents an environmental amenity that is in disrepair, and thus the 
informational effect could be that citizens are finding out about this effect for the first time, it could be 
that they are finding out that there is a program to fix this problem, or it could be both. Thus a positive 
coefficient on something like beach closures makes sense in the forward looking sense as it was likely 
something citizens were already aware of and the listing effect is a prediction that beaches will be more 
likely to be open in the future. The information effect of degraded fish populations could have that same 
forward looking result, but it could also be something that non-fishers were not aware of, it could 
immediately reduce tourism etc. It is with caution that these results are presented and interpreted 
individually, but this breakdown lends some credence to the intuition behind forward looking versus 
negative perception effects, and perhaps the relative magnitudes is also informative.     
 
 
 
VIII. Discussion 
The results found are large and significant and in the hypothesized direction across 
specifications, demonstrating a strong negative informational effect on tract average property value 
after AOC listing. While this finding is meaningful, there are some important caveats in the methodology 
that should be refined in future efforts. The first is the coarseness of the data. Utilizing decennial census 
information (3 cross sections) and tract level effects, the data are not nearly as finely grained as that of 
the preexisting literature, which use individual housing transaction data and block level characteristics. 
Another caveat is in the AOC spatial data, where the extent of an AOC is seemingly up to the associated 
parties (State, local, EPA) and some follow exact water features while others cover larger and landed 
areas. This would spatial aspect would in fact make the estimations more conservative, but is still 
something that needs to be addressed in future work. This is also slightly under examined in the 
literature, as it is unclear exactly what kinds of spatial files Superfund has made available, and whether 
they are property boundaries, affected areas or something else. In the AOC context, it makes sense to 
think about the broader impacts that water based contamination could have, and future studies should 
include more uniform determinations.  
Additionally, a control strategy similar to the RDD work on Superfund sites could lend some 
additional confidence to the figures found here, as the distance-as-control methodology is second-best 
in some ways. Future work on AOC’s should investigate the historical sites considered but not listed as 
AOC’s as potential controls, but that data was not available for the purposes of this investigation.  
A final caveat is related to the US Census. Before the 1990 census, the country was not fully 
tracted and large swathes of area (mostly rural) were not covered. This is further compounded by the 
questions asked, as property information and pricing were questions not asked/answered even in some 
tracted regions. Thus the sample of tracts with repeat housing value observation data from 1970-1990 
was limited down to a fraction of the Great Lakes region. Thus some AOC’s have very little data 
surrounding them. While it is unlikely that AOC placement/distance and tracting are endogenous, it is 
possible that it is correlated with other observed and unobserved variables. This problem could certainly 
be addressed with finer level, non-census housing transaction data, or perhaps an instrumental variables 
approach.  
While there were some data limitations, the results were found to be robust and suggestive of a 
negative listing effect. These strong findings motivate future work using different data sources to further 
pin down the effect. 
 
IX. Conclusion  
The results demonstrate significant and negative impacts of the AOC listing decision on tract 
average housing value. This ranges from -4.4% to -7.6% under the various specifications examined (all 
significant at the 1% level), and is largest under the preferred specification of a 32 KM, single boundary 
effect. This finding begins to unravel the question of hazardous waste listing effects, pointing to the 
negative perception effects far outweighing any positive, forward looking effects.  
Despite these caveats, the results are robust under various sets of tests and demonstrate a 
strong negative relationship between listing and property value. The results support an interpretation of 
a distance based information effect versus a hyper-local observational effect, which is certainly an 
important policy takeaway. The effects of specific beneficial use impairments is also an interesting point 
of discussion, as they demonstrate the ways in which forward looking effects interact with negative 
perception changing effects in order to create the informational effect. One of the key questions 
motivating this investigation was the composition of the listing effect, and thus an ability to decompose 
it and discuss competing sub-effects is an important policy takeaway.  
The findings of this investigation suggest a large and negative listing effect that could potentially 
dwarf the positive effects of a restoration effort. This effect should, theoretically, be turned off at 
delisting, yet the case oftentimes is that a hazardous waste site, whether it’s AOC, Superfund or 
something else, is under remediation efforts for several decades. Only 4 of the 41 international AOC’s 
have been delisted, and thus an attempt to evaluate the economic impacts of remediation for all other 
sites is likely covered up by the deleterious effects of listing. The findings of this paper suggest that 
policy makers and evaluators should take the listing effect into account in order to understand the 
tradeoffs between remediation, property value change and project completion.         
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A.1 Summary Statistics 
 Within 18 KM  Outside 18 
KM 
 
     
 Mean SE Mean SE 
     
Population 3658.646 1634.6 3504.087 1646.2 
%Black .1620381 .311 .0869876 .206 
%Hispanic .0288567 .080 .0389504 .089 
%Under 18 .3021047 .080 .2903836 .082 
%Foreign Born .0557377 .055 .0753293 .099 
%Female Head Household .1847758 .183 .1470266 .138 
Unemployment rate .0766784 .063 .055258 .041 
Poverty Rate .1064931 .116 .090846 .090 
% Welfare .077289 .097 .056973 .067 
Average HH Income 24624.89 16517.1 25667.4 18118.3 
%Occupied homes .9517074 .044 .9514936 .045 
%Owner Occupied .5658244 .240 .5289635 .249 
Housing Density 827.2784 932.2 1268.211 2354.1 
Population Density 2214.63 2374.0 3280.046 5720.8 
HS Dropout .1837504 .078 .1582706 .071 
MS Dropout .1622171 .116 .1615575 .114 
Only HS .3401712 .087 .3471797 .087 
Some College .1478906 .062 .1425129 .058 
College Degree .1663979 .142 .1910344 .146 
%Attached homes .6561238 .259 .6084082 .300 
%Mobile Homes .2201514 .325 .2063906 .314 
% 0-2 Bedrooms .4137672 .186 .4422327 .209 
%3-4 Bedrooms .5588158 .180 .5256489 .195 
%Moved in last 5 yrs .3411459 .235 .342067 .229 
%Built w/in 5 yrs .0956895 .132 .1040595 .130 
%Built w/in 10 yrs .1777652 .200 .1961442 .204 
Observations 12126  27930  
     
 
 
 
 
 
A.2 Beneficial Use Impairment (BUI) Code 
 
ResC Restrictions on fish and wildlife consumption 
Tain Tainting of fish and wildlife flavor 
DegF Degraded fish and wildlife populations 
Fish Fish tumors or other deformities  
Bird Bird or animal deformities or reproductive 
problems 
DegB Degraded benthos 
ResD Restrictions on dredging activities 
Eutr Eutrophication or undesirable algae 
ResW Restrictions on drinking water consumption 
or taste and odor problems 
Beac Beach closings 
DegA Degradation of aesthetics 
AddC Added costs to agriculture or industry 
DegP Degradation of phytoplankton and 
zooplankton populations 
Loss Loss of fish and wildlife habitat 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A.3 Balanced Data Set 
Each tract observed in the panel data set was included as it had full information for all three 
decade censuses (1970, 1980 and 1990). Given that that the listing effect, or treatment, is both a 
distance buffer and a time stamp, the panel data is not fully balanced as there are twice as many pre 
listing observations as post. This remains the ideal specification as this additional 1970 data only adds 
further support to the change in trends post-listing, but Table 6 performs a balanced regression, under 
the specification of 18 KM distance buffer, full suite controls and equation (3) using only 1980 and 1990 
data to investigate a fully balanced data set. Predictably, the effect is lower and represents a -2.5% 
change in tract average housing value due to listing effects for treatment distance bounded tracts. While 
the effect has lowered, it is still fairly large and significant at the 5% level, which supports the above 
findings  
 
                      Table 6: Single Buffer, Full Suite 
 Full Panel 1980 and 1990 
18 KM -0.0587*** -0.0243** 
 (0.0087) (0.0099) 
   
BUI -0.0197*** -0.0255*** 
 (0.0021) (0.0021) 
Observations 40056 26704 
Adjusted R2 0.8644 0.7821 
                          Robust Standard errors in parentheses 
Decennial Census 1970, 1980 and 1990 
Single distance buffer (tract centroid to AOC edge), county x year, property, AOC x year effects 
Full Suite (FS) Effects: Years considered, distance to nearest water feature, distance to nearest Superfund site, lake x year 
effects, BUI effects 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
